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REALISM, RATIOCINATION, AND RULES 
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS' 
I. Introduction 
The literature in jurisprudence shows a recent interest in the question of what 
mathematics, or more properly metamathematics, I may say about the nature of 
law.2 Particularly, scholars have attempted to apply theories regarding the 
indeterminacy of mathematics) to law in order to show that law must also be 
indeterminate. 
Professors Rogers and Molzon,4 Brown and Greenberg,S and D'Amato,6 among 
others, have all sought to draw some insight into law through an examination of 
GodeI's Theorem.7 GodeI's Theorem demonstrates that any formalization of 
arithmetic will be incomplete. That is, no matter what axioms one chooses as the 
basis from which to prove the truths of arithmetic, there will always exist 
propositions that can neither be proved true nor false. There will always be gaps, 
and the addition of further axioms for arithmetic will not fill the gaps. Thus, an 
infinity of unprovable propositions will always remain. 
Professor D'Amato concludes that GodeI's Theorem carries over to law and 
demonstrates that there will always be an infinity of legal propositions that can be 
neither proved nor disproved.8 Brown and Greenberg similarly conclude that 
"GodeI's Theorem reveals that the law cannot be a determinate formal system. "9 
* Professor of Law , University of Oklahoma. A.B., 1968, Franklin & Marshall College; M.S., 1970, 
M.A., 1976, Ph.D., 1978, University of Miami; J.~., 1984, University of Michigan. 
1. Metamathematics is the study of mathematics rather than study within mathematics. It is the 
examination of the nature of mathematics rather than the derivation of propositions within particular 
mathematical systems. 
2. See, e.g., John M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of Law, 55 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 195 (1980); John M. Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects of Self-Reference in 
Dworkin's Rights Thesis; 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 371 (1980). See infra notes 4-6. 
3. See infra notes 7-25 and accompanying text. 
4. John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential 
Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992). 
5. Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally T,fndecidable Propositions of Law: Legal 
Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992). 
6. Anthony O'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 561 (1989) [hereinafter O'Amato, Judicial Interpretation]. 
7. For a discussion of Godel's Theorem and an explanation of the proof, see generally ERNEST 
NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF (1958). 
8. O'Amato, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 6, at 597. 
9. Brown & Greenberg, supra'note 5, at 1487. While Brown and Greenberg insert the word 
"formal" and might then be read to leave open the possibility that law is a determinate informal system, 
O'Amato argues that if law is a nonformal system, it must for that reason be indeterminate. Anthony 
O'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 175-76 n.92 (1990) [hereinafter O'Amato, 
Pragmatic Indeterinacy]. 
219 
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Professors Rogers and Molzon seem more reluctant to apply Godel's Theorem 
directly to law but state: "Godel's Theorem strongly suggests that it is impossible 
to create a legal system that is complete in the sense that there is a derivable rule 
for every fact situatioJl."m 
Professor D'Amato has also found import in mathematics' Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorem that any axiom set for an area of mathematics will admit an infinite 
variety of alternate interpretations. II That is, in any attempt to develop a set of 
axioms from which th~ truths of a particular area of mathematics may be derived, 
there will be alternative mathematical systems that satisfy the same axioms. 
D'Amato combines thl~ Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem with other mathematical or 
philosophical arguments to conclude that "even a highly formalized set of rules, 
such as the Restatements of Contracts and Torts, can consistently be said to 'apply' 
to mutually inconsistent descriptions of fact situations."12 
Professor Ken Kress attacks these efforts to use the theorems of metamathematics 
to draw conclusions about the nature of law!3 He points out that the Lowenheim-
Skolem Theorem applies to rigorously defined formal systems and that 
English[] and legal language are insufficiently precise for the assertions 
and inferences ·of a formal proof such as the Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorem to be true and valid about them. As mathematicians put it, the 
Lowenheim-Skolem proof will not go through in legal English. There 
is therefore no n~ason to suppose that the conclusion of the proof, the 
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, is true -in legal English ... !4 
In response, D'Amato continues to assert the relevance of the Lowenheim-Skolem 
proof, but he also argues that if legal English is so informal as to not aJlow the 
proof, that also demonstrates indeterminacy. 
While Professor Kress specifically attacks the use of the Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorem, similar objections apply to the application of Godel's Theorem to law. 
Godel's Theorem works in mathematics, because Godel managed to express the 
metalanguage for arithmetic, the language used to talk about arithmetic, within 
arithmetic!S In order for Godel's Theorem to apply to law, it would seem that the 
same feat must be accomplished for law. More is required than showing that laws 
may be self-referential or that law may have rules and metarules. 16 Required is a 
demonstration that the metalanguage of law - legal English - can in some sense 
be embedded in the law. It is certainly not obvious that that can be accomplished; 
indeed, it may even be unclear what it means. 
10. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at 992. 
II. Anthony O'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 5[3, 52[ n.28 (1989). 
12. O'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminaq, supra note 9, at 175-76. 
13. Ken Kress, A Pre/ace to Epistem%gicClllndeterminac:y, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. [34 ([990). 
[4. Id. at [44. 
[5. See NAGEl.. & NEWMAN, supra note 7. 
[6. See Rogers & Molzon, supra note 4, at [002-21. 
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Professors Rogers and Molzon do, however, draw an important nonanalytic 
conclusion from their examination of Godel's Theorem. Even if Godel's Theorem 
does prove the incompleteness of law, they note that "legal theorists must become 
comfortable with the incompleteness of legal systems, no matter how carefully 
constructed, in the same way that mathematicians and philosophers have become 
comfortable with the incompleteness of axiomatic systems of number theory.'1\7 
That does seem to be an important observation. While it is questionable what 
formal logic results of mathematics carry over to law, the psychological observation 
that incompleteness has not hobbled practitioners of mathematics, the seeming 
paradigm of certainty, may carry over to relieve our anxieties over incompleteness 
in the area of law.ls 
That last observation of Rogers and Molzon also raises the issue that is the focus 
. of this article - an exploration of what the self-examination of mathematicians with 
regard to their work can do to address the indeterminacy concerns of the American 
legal realists. The American legal realist judges, in their exercises of self-
examination, noted that they did not apply rules but instead intuited conclusions.19 
Only once the conclusion was in hand did the judges attempt to construct what at 
least would appear to be legal analysis leading to that conclusion.20 
While the realists did not jump from their observation to the conclusion that there 
are no legal rules, others have not been so reticent.21 If what would appear to be 
legal rules and principles actually play no role in reaching a legal conclusion or the 
outcome of a case, it might be argued they are not real rules. Rather than directing 
results, legal rules and principles would serve only as post hoc r~tionalizations. 
While it might be argued that they at least serve as limitations in that, while the 
principles are adopted post hoc, they must be found in preexisting law, it may be 
countered that there exists such a variety of competing and inconsistent principles 
that there is no conclusion that cannot find such post hoc justification.22 
This article will first examine the claims of the legal realists and the later claims 
that there are no legal rules.23 A parallel wiII then be drawn to the self-examination 
of mathematicians, who also note that they work backwards from conclusions to 
arguments for those conclusions.24 Lastly, the comparison between legal and 
17. Id. at 992. 
18. It is important to note that incompleteness is a far lesser weakness than radical indeterminacy. 
Incompleteness asserts only that there are propositions that can not be proven either true or false. While 
there are an infinity of such propositions in any formalization of arithmetic, there are also propositions 
that are provable. Even if Godel's Theorem were to carry over to law, it would prove only that there are 
hard cases not formally decidable under precedent, not that all ca~es are undecidable. See infra notes 66-
68 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 26-27, 32 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 28-31, 33-34 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text. 
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mathematical analysis will call into question the conclusion that there are no legal 
rules.25 
II. Realism and Legal Analysis 
Judge Hutcheson, in The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in 
Judicial Decision,26 an article in which the thesis is clear from the title, explained 
his method of reaching a decision in a legal case. He said, "I, after canvassing all 
the available material at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my 
imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch -
that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark connection 
between question and decision . . . .'127 The judge also noted that he was 
"speak[ing] of the judgment pronounced, as opposed to the rationalization by the 
judge on that pronouncement.',28 
With regard to the rationalization, the judge tells us that, while the 
motivating impu15e for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right 
or wrong for that cause, ... the astute judge, having so decided, enlists 
his every faculty and belabors his laggard mind, not only to justify that 
intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with his critics.29 
Further, 
having travailed and reached his judgment, he struggles to bring up and 
pass in review before his eager mind all of the categories and concepts 
which he may find useful directly or by analogy, so as to select from 
them that which in his opinion will support his desired result. ... [T]he 
judge ... must at least appear reasonable, and unless he can find a 
category which will at least "sembI ably" support his view, he will feel 
uncomfortable.30 
With regard to the direetion of any analysis, he quotes Max Radin in describing the 
judge as "'working his judgment backward' as he blazes his trail 'from a desirable 
conclusion back to one or another of a stock of legal premises."'JI 
Judge Jerome Frank reached much the same conclusion in his examination of the 
work of a judge. He commented on ~udging generally, writing: 
The process of judging, so the psychologists tell us, seldom begins with 
a premise from which a conclusion is subsequently worked out. 
25. See infra notes 59-~,8 and accompanying text. 
26. Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 
14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929). 
27. Id. at 278. 
28. Id. at 279. 
29. Id. at 285. 
30. Id. at 286-87. 
31. Id. at 287 (quoting Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 
A.B.A. J. 357,359 (1925». 
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Judgment begins rather the other way around - with a conclusion more 
or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion 
and afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it.32 
223 
He argues that the situation is the same in law. "Judicial judgments, like other 
judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are worked out backward from conclusions 
tentatively formulated. ,,33 
Legal opinions, Judge Frank tells us, are misleading. "They picture the judge 
applying rules and principles to the facts, that is, taking some rule or principle 
(usually derived from opinions in earlier cases) as his major premise, employing the 
facts of the case as the minor premise, and then coming to his judgment by process 
of pure reasoning."34 For Judge Frank, also, it is the conclusion that is adopted 
first, by intuition or hunch, and then the opinion is constructed by arguing backward 
from that conclusion to generally accepted premises. 
The observations of the legal realists did not lead them all to reject the existence 
of legal rules. In fact, Judge Frank said: "It is sometimes asserted that to deny that 
law consists of rules is to deny the existence of legal rules. That is specious 
reasoning .... [W]hile rules are not the only factor in the making of law, i.e. 
decisions, that is not to say there are no rules."3s Professor Llewellyn also argued 
that rules of law were obviously not eliminated but that the arguments of the realists 
explained the importance of the rules as "authoritative ought[s] addressed to 
officials" but to which the officials may "either pay no heed at all ... or listen 
partly ... or listen with all care .... "36 
While the Realists themselves may have been reluctant to dismiss the existence 
of any real legal rules, some scholars of the critical legal studies movement have 
been less reticent. The "crits," like the realists, claim that "language is vague and 
... when two conflicting rules often cover the same factual setting, there is no 
separate mechanical rule as to which one governs.'0J7 In the crit view, "mainstream 
liberal thought . . . is simultaneously beset by internal colltradiction (not by 
'competing concerns' artfully balanced until a wise equilibrium is reached, but by 
irreducible, irremedial, irresolvable conflict) and by systematic repression of the 
presence of these contradictions."38 As Professor Singer says, "Legal doctrines are 
always potentially indeterminant. Judges can move the line between rules and 
exceptions, or create new exceptions .... [T]he legal theories advanced to justify 
32. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108 (1930). o 
33. Id. at 109. 
34. Id. at Ill. 
35. FRANK, supra note 32, at 141-42. Judge Frank has been characterized as finding such legal rules 
only marginally important in the conduct of trials, Charles M. Yablon, Justifying tile Judge's Huncll: An 
Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 231, 237 (1990), but that does not deny their existence or 
importance in the appellate context, nor their importance in some jury trials. 
36. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - Tile Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 449 
(1930). 
37. MARK KELMAN. A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (1987). 
38. Id. at 3. 
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our rules and institutions are indeterminant. The same theories could be used to 
justify very different sorts of institutions and very different rules."39 
Sounding the same note, Professor Kelman attacks legal argument: 
Most of the arguments that law professors make are not only nonsensi-
cal according to some obscure and unreachable criteria of Universal 
Validity but they are also patently unstable babble. The shakiness of the 
argumentative structure is, quite remarkably, readily elucidated. All the 
fundamental, rhetorically necessary distinctions collapse at a feather's 
touch .... 40 
And similarly, from Professor Peller: 
The study of the underlying metaphysical assumptions of legal thought 
suggests that the purported distinction between rational legal argumenta-
tion and irrational emotional appeal is incoherent. Legal thought is 
merely one instance in a series of arational attempts to capture social 
experience in reproducible form. It is not qualitatively different from 
what it exclude:> as irrationa1.41 
Professor Kelman would, however, distinguish the realists and the crits by noting 
the crits' stress is not only on the ambiguity of language but also on the psychologi-
cal conflict that leads to the simultaneous commitment both to mechanical rules and 
to ad hoc standards.42 Kelman appears to view the true heirs of the realists as those 
who, like Professors Fish43 and D'Amato,44 argue the nonexistence of rules based 
on the ambiguity of bnguage. Whoever may be the true heirs of the realists, their 
influence is still felt, and the snowball of contradiction or indeterminacy that began 
with their self-reflective observations is still rolling. 
II. The Mathematical Endeavor 
It is striking how similar the views of the American realist judges with regard to 
their work are to tho~:e of mathematicians with regard to their work. Both groups 
show concern that the nature of how they reach conclusions is not reflected in their 
published works. The judges assert that they reach the conclusion first and then 
work backwards to the premises that will justify that conclusion. Mathematicians 
39. Joseph W. Singer. The Pillyer lind the Cllrds: Nihilism lind Leglll The(}ry. 94 YALE L.1. 1.22-24 
(1984). " 
40. Mark G. Kelman. Trashing. 36 STAN. L. REV. 293. 322 (1984). 
41. Gary Peller. The Metllphysics (}f Americlln Law. 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151. 1155 (1985). 
42. KELMAN. supra note 37. at 3. 13.44. 
43. See, e.g .• Stanley Fish, W(}rking (}n the Chllin Gllng: Interpretllti(}n in Law lind Literature. 60 
TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Stanley Fish. Wrong Agllin. 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983); Stanley Fish, Still 
Wrong After All These Yet'rs, 6 LAW & PHIL. 401 (1987). 
44. See, e.g .• Anthony D'Amato, Prllgmlltic Indeterminll~Y. supra note 9. Professor D'Amato 
acknowledges that the realists "gave us a taste of something profound" but notes that they lacked the 
insights of the writings of Wittgenstein, Goodman, Quine and Kripke. /d. at 154. The difference seems 
one of philosophical sophistication rather than the different focus Kelman claims. 
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also express concern that the theories they publish make it appear that they simply 
proceeded step by step from a set of axioms to the conclusion. They protest that, 
in fact, they reach their conclusions first and then see what axioms or theorems are 
required to prove that conclusion or whether or not the conclusion can be proved 
from a particular set of axioms. 
Professor Polya compares the view of mathematics held by the non-mathemati-
cian and even some mathematics instructors with that of the research mathematician: 
To some instructors, mathematics appears as a system of rigorous 
proofs .... To a mathematician, who is active in research, mathematics 
may appear sometimes as a guessing game: you have to guess a 
mathematical theorem before you prove it, you have to guess the idea 
of the proof before you carry through the details.4s 
Further, "[i]t may appear ... surprising to the layman that the mathematician is 
.. guessing. The result of the mathematician's creative work is demonstrative 
reasoning, a proof, but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by 
guessing."46 It is interesting to note that one of Professor Polya's most influential 
works in mathematics education was a film titled Let Us Teach Guessing.47 
Professor Littlewood, one of Cambridge University's great mathematicians, 
describes the process of mathematical research and creation as having four phases: 
preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification.43 While the preparation is 
a conscious activity, the incubation, Littlewood says, is a period of subconscious 
work. Of the other two phases, illumination and verification, Littlewood says that 
the verification, the working out of the proof, is "within the range of any competent . 
practitioner, given the illumination."49 On the other hand, "[i]llumination, ... the 
emergence of the creative idea into the conscious[,] ... implies some mysterious 
rapport between the subconscious and the conscious .... "so 
It is the verification, the working out or proof, that appears in the mathematics 
journal or textbook, but for Littlewood that is not really the creative aspect of 
mathematics. The creative aspect, the illumination, is not described in, and in fact, 
lacks formal rigor. As with the realist judge, the conclusion is intuited and the 
demonstration is later worked out.SI 
45. GEORGE POLYA, PATIERNS OF PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE 158 (1954). 
46. Id. 
47. LET Us TEACH GUESSING (George Polya film produced for Comm. on Educ. Media, 
Mathematical Ass'n of America, by Kurt Simon Productions, 1965). 
48. John Littlewood, The Mathematician's Art of Work, 5 ROCKEFELLER U. REV. I, 3 (1967), 
reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS OF J.E. LITTI..EWOOD 1625, 1627 (1982). Justice Cardozo used similar 
language in his discussion of how judges reach legal conclusions, writing of the "successive stages of 
preparation, incubation and illumination." BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 59-
60 (1928), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 251, 286 (Margaret E. 
Hall ed., 1947). 
49. Littlewood, supra note 48, at 3. 
50. Id. 
51. Professor Mark Kac makes much the same point. He distinguishes between strategy and tactics 
of proof, which he also rephrases as the distinction between motivation and execution. He notes with 
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Not only do mathematicians not, ·in fact, nonnaIly start with the premises and 
axioms to see what may be generated; such an approach, even in theory, is 
implausible. The mathematician Henri Poincare describes mathematical creation: 
It does not consist in making new combinations with mathematical 
entities already known. Anyone could do that, but the combinations so 
made would be infinite in number and most of them absolutely without 
interest. To create consists precisely in not making useless combinations 
and in making those which are useful and which are only a smaIl 
minority. Invention is discernment, choice.51 
He, too, finds the occurrence of sudden illumination in mathematical creation 
striking, and finds th(~ role of unconscious activity uncontestable.s3 
While other mathematicians could be cited,54 this part of the examination will 
close with the views of the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. 
It is difficult to decide between the two definitions of mathematics; the 
one is by its method, that of drawing necessary conclusions; the other 
by its aim and subject matter, as the study of hypothetical states of 
things. The former makes or seems to make the deduction of conse-
quences of hypotheses the sole business of the mathematician as such. 
But it cannot b(~ denied that immense genius has been exercised in the 
mere framing of ... hypotheses.ss 
The non-mathematician may view the work of the mathematician as sitting down 
with a set of axioms and deriving results from those axioms. While the result must 
be shown to be deliv(!d from the axioms, one must have a result in mind when the 
deductive effort begins or the likelihood of producing an important piece of 
mathematics would b:: similar to the likelihood of the proverbial monkey randomly 
typing the sonnet. The direction of the deductive effort and the result toward which 
regret the fact that published mathematics stresses the execution and largely ignores the motivation. 
MARK KAC, ENIGMAS OF CHANCE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2 (1985). 
52. Henri Poincare, Mathematical Creati(}n, 4 THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 2041, 2043 (James 
R. Newman ed., 1956). 
53. [d. at 2045. 
54. See, e.g., PAUl. R. HAI.MOS, I WANT To BE A MATHEMATICIAN: AN AUTOMATHOGRAPHY 321 
(1985) ("Mathematics is n,)t a deductive science .... When you try to prove a theorem, you don't just 
list the hypotheses, and then start to reason. What you do is trial and error, experimentation, 
guesswork."); James J. Sylvester, The Study That Knows N(}thing ofObservati(}n, in 3 THE WORI.D OF 
MATHEMATICS 1758, 1759 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) ("[M]athematical analysis is constantly 
invoking the aid of new principles, new ideas, and new methods, not capable of being defined by any 
form of words, but springing direct from the inherent powers and activity of the human mind, and from 
continually renewed intro)spection of that inner world of thought . . . ."); see a/s(} LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS proposition 1-167, 47e (O.H. von 
Wright et al. eds., 1956) (trans. by O.E.M. Anscombe) ("The mathematician is an inventor, not a 
discoverer. ") . 
. 55. Charles S. Peirce. The Essence (}f Mathematics, 3 THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 1773, 1779 
(James R. Newman ed., 1956). 
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the proof is directed must precede the proof itself. The source of the proposed result 
is not deduction, it is intuition, illumination, or hunch. 
The American realists' view of the work of the judge is similar. The realist denies 
that the judge sits down with a set of legal rules or principles and a set of facts 
relevant to the case at hand and subsequently derives a result from those rules and 
facts. Rather, the judge has a result in mind before the opinion writing effort 
begins. That result is also reached by intuition, illumination, or hunch. 
In both mathematics and in the realists' view of law, the already accepted 
conclusion provides the direction for the construction of a form of deductive 
demonstration. Both the mathematician and the judge work backward. The 
mathematician determines what lesser results would suffice to prove the intended 
result, what is required to prove the lesser results, and so on until reaching a 
recognized set of axioms or a set of propositions the mathematician is willing to 
accept as a basis for his or her work.56 The realist judges claim to have done the 
same. With result in mind, the judge works backwards to reach accepted principles 
or rules that justify the result. 
Both the mathematician and the judge then mask the true nature of their efforts. 
When the proof is written, it begins with the statement of axioms and assumptions 
and proceeds step by step to the result. The creative effort that went into 
recognizing the result as being both of interest and potentially provable is ignored. 
When the opinion is written, it begins with a recitation of the facts,S7 sets out rules 
and principles of law, and demonstrates that the result logically follows from the 
facts and law. That the result was first reached by hunch or intuition is hidden, and 
seemingly denied, by the deductive form of the opinion. 
It is interesting to note that at least one of the American realist judges noted the 
similarity between at least the initial intuited stages of law and mathematics. Judge 
Hutcheson, in discussing intuition or hunch, wrote: 
[I]t is that tiptoe faculty of the mind which can feel and follow a hunch 
which makes not only the best gamblers, ... lawyers ... [and] judges 
... , but it is the same faculty which has guided and will continue to 
guide the great scientists of the world, and even those august dealers in 
certitude, the mathematicians themselves, to their most difficult 
solutions .... 5H 
What remains is to see what these similarities say about law and legal analysis. 
56. A mathematician working in group theory, for example, may not be able to derive an intuited 
result from the axioms of group theory alone. But, it may be that the addition of another assumption 
would suffice. If the result is important enough and there are a sufficiently interesting number of groups 
meeting the additional assumption, a result applying to that special area of group theory would be 
significant. 
57. It is, of course, only the relevant facl~ that are presented, and the choice of facl~ as relevant 
would also be argued to be result driven. 
58. Hutcheson, supra note 26, at 279. 
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Ill. What Does the Comparison Say About Rules of Law? 
If the fact that the realist judges confessed to working backwards from conclusion 
to principles and rules is to lead to the conclusion that there are no rules of law, it 
would appear that the fact that mathematicians work in the same direction would 
lead to the conclusion that there are no mathematical rules or principles. No one 
makes such a claim of mathematics. Indeed, mathematics is the paradigm of a 
formal system. Whatever the direction of the mathematician's initial work, the result 
is accepted as mathematics only when the later demonstration is presented and the 
result is seen to flow from the application of rules of inference to recognized 
axioms or principIe:;.59 Thus, unless there is some relevant difference between 
mathematical and legal reasoning, it would be questionable to conclude that there 
are no rules of law. 
There are, of course, differences between law and mathematics. Mathematics is 
a formal system with a rigor that would appear not possible in law. Holmes warned 
of "[t]he danger [inl the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be 
worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct."m Even 
jurisprudes who argue that there are rules for legal analysis that provide for the 
existence of right answers to difficult legal questions do not assert that those rules 
have the logical rigor of mathematics.61 
It might be argued that one relevant difference between law and mathematics is 
that law is incomplete. There are gaps in the law, and at least a part of the judicial 
function is said to be legislating at the interstices of the law.62 These gaps 
necessarily occur, because legislation cannot be written in sufficient detail to include 
all possibilities. Law might then be seen as differing from mathematics in that, 
while one will always (at least in principle) be able to prove or d.isprove a 
mathematical proposition, there will always be legal questions the answers to which 
are not controlled by statute or prior case law. 
The flaw in this argument is that it does not, as Godel's Theorem demonstrates/oJ 
distinguish law from mathematics. Since even as a rule governed system such as 
59. There has been some recent concern over the presentation of a demonstration. The recent 
solution to the four color problem - the question of whether or not four colors are sufficient to color, 
with no abutting area.~ the same color, any map meeting certain conditions - involved computer 
programs that did not all'ow for a step by step examination of a deductive demonstration. See, e./:., 
Edward Swart, The Philosophical Implicati()JL~ of the Four-Color Problem, 87 AM. MATHEMATICAL 
MONTHLY 697 (1980); Thoma.~ Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem and Its Philosophical Si/:nijicallC:e, 
76 J. PHIL 57 (1979). 
60. O.W. Holmes, TIle Path lifthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897). 
61. Professor Dworkin, for example, allows decisions to be based not only on the explicit holdings 
of pa.~t opinions but from the moral principles those decisions presuppose a.~ justification. See. e./: .. 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 96 (1986). Such mining out of underlying moral principles would 
seem to lack mathematical rigor, although the search would still be for moral rules adopted by earlier 
judges. 
62. See Southern P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917) (Holmes, J.). 
63. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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mathematics61 is incomplete, the incompleteness of law should not lead to the 
conclusion that law is not rule governed. It also must be remembered what Godel's 
Theorem actually demonstrates. The fact that there are holes in any axiomatization 
of arithmetic does not mean that there are no truths of arithmetic. There are plenty 
of arithmetic propositions that can be proved true or false. Godel's Theorem only 
tells us that there are al~.o an infinity of such propositions that can be proven neither 
true nor false. Most of the important propositions fall into the provable class,6s 
because the axioms are chosen to provide a basis for what is known to be important 
to arithmetic. 
Even if Godel's Theorem were to carry over to law,66 it should prove no more 
in law than it does in mathematics. While the theorem may have dealt a blow to the 
Hilbert program of developing a formalization that would capture all of mathemat-
ics, no one seriously proposes such a formalization of law. While such an 
application of the theorem to law would also demonstrate that there will be legal 
questions that are undecidable within existing law, it is already generally accepted 
that there are some hard cases, and Godel's Theorem would not demonstrate that all 
cases are hard cases. As in arithmetic, the important issues might be resolvable.67 
Where there are hard cases, a new "axiom," a new rule of law, must be added to 
deal with the issue. Similarly in mathematics, new axioms must be added if holes 
are to be filled. Again, the addition of the axiom of arithmetic will fill only some 
of the holes, and there will remain an infinity of undecidable propositions. The 
same will be true of the addition of the new rule of law. The existence of holes has 
not led mathematicians to despair; there are mathematical propositions that are easy 
to prove. It should not lead jurisprudes to despair; there might still be easy cases. 
The way in which new rules of law are selected to fill the holes in the law is, of 
course, extralegal.6.~ However, the same must be true of arithmetic. The choice of 
an additional axiom would have to be motivated by the conclusions one wishes to 
be able to derive. That choice cannot be determined with the arithmetic system, 
because the proposition at issue was undecidable within that system. Once again the 
fact that the rules and axioms of arithmetic don't cover everything, and that new 
rules must sometimes be invented, does not lead to the conclusion that there are no 
rules in mathematics and should not lead to the parallel conclusion in law. 
64. The characterization of mathematics as rule governed is not to deny the role of intuition nor to 
suggest, contrary to Godel's Theorem, that any proposition or it~ negation is provable from a set of 
axioms. Rather, the characterization assert~ only that there are well defined rules of inference from 
accepted sets of axioms. 
65. But see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
67. This is not to deny the existence of other reasons why all cases might be hard cases. Godel's 
Theorem does not speak to the crits' claim that conflicting psychological commitments lead to 
irresolvable conflict in law, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, or to the claim that language is 
so inherently ambiguous that rule.~ cannot be given definitive readings, see supra note.~ 43-44 and 
accompanying text. 
68. Even Professor Dworkin agrees that the judge's political morality plays a role in the decision 
of hard cases. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 255-56. 
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Perhaps the major difference between the two fields is in whether and how one 
can know he or she is incorrect in the initial intuition, illumination, or hunch. 
·Mathematicians recognize the regularity with which the intuition is in error. 
Poincare finds such instances to be fairly regular. 
I have spoken of the feeling of absolute certitude accompanying the 
inspiration; in the cases cited this feeling was no deceiver, nor is it 
usually. But do not think this a rule without exception; often this 
feeling deceives us without being any less vivid, and we only find it out 
when we seek to put on foot the demonstration.69 
Professor Halmos seems to find the experience of the incorrect intuition even more 
regular. 
After tossing and turning a while ... I 'solve' the problem; the proof or 
the counterexample arrives in a flash of insight and, content, I roll over 
and fall asleep. Almost always the flash turns out to be spurious; the 
proof has a gigantic hole in it or the counterexample is not counter 
anything .... On a few occasions it even turned out to be right.7" 
The mathematician cannot always, however, tell when the intuition is incorrect. 
Certainly, if in attempting to prove a proposition one manages instead to prove its 
negation or finds a coJunterexample to the proposition,'1 then it is clear that the 
intuition was incorrect. According to Poincare, in such instances of flawed 
illumination "we almost always notice that this false idea, had it been true, would 
have gratified our natural feeling for mathematical elegance. ,,72 
There are important mathematical propositions that have been under examination 
for years, or even centuries, but have never been proved. Probably, the two most 
notable examples, and certainly the most simply stated, are Goldbach's conjecture 
and Fermat's "theorem." Goldbach's conjecture73 is that every even number is the 
sum of two prime numbers. Fermat's "theorem"74 is that, where n is greater than 
2, there are no whole numbers, a, band c for which d' + b" = c". Despite a great 
deal of effort on the part of generations of mathematicians, no proof exists for either 
69. Poincare, supra nete 52, at 2046. 
70. HALMOS, supra nNe 54, at 324. Lest Professor Halmos be thought a lesser mathematician, it 
should be noted that he was writing about fooling himself into going to sleep when his subconscious wa.~ 
working on a problem. Th~ intuitions he generated in that attempt may not have had the intensity of 
those of Poincare and h~ rr.ay have accepted them to put his mind to rest. 
71. A counterexample is a set of facl~ for which a proposition is false. As a simple example, the 
number two serves as a counterexample to the proposition all prime nllmbers are (ld{/. 
n. Henri Poincare, supra note 52, at 2048. 
73. See Edward Ka.~ner & James R. Newman, Pastimes of Past and Presellt Times, ill 4 THE WORLD 
OF MATIlEMATICS 2416, 2437-38 (James R. Newman ed., 1956). 
74. See Eric T. Bell, The Queen (If Mathematics, in I THE WORLD OF MATIlEMATICS 498, 509 
(Jame.~ R. Newman ed., 1956). 
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proposition.7s Neither, however, has a counterexample for eitner been presented, 
and proofs limited to numbers of certain sizes have been presented.76 
The difference here between law and mathematics seems to be that it may be less 
clear that the legal hunch or intuition is incorrect. While there are some mathemati-
cal hunches or intuitions that have never been shown correct or incorrect, at least 
it is not uncommon that a mathematical intuition is shown to be incorrect. On the 
other hand, it may be argued that the legal intuition can never be shown to be 
incorrect. 
As Professor Kennedy and other scholars in the critical legal studies tradition 
have argued, law may be deeply conflicted.77 If in every case there are conflicting 
principles that may be brought to bear, then perhaps one's hunch can never be 
demonstrated to be incorrect. Any intuition at which one arrives could be derived 
from such a set of conflicted or inconsistent legal principles.7K Of course, the 
opposite intuition can also be so derived. From whatever hunch one begins, one can 
always work one's way back to a set of premises to justify that hunch. Any 
conclusion can be demonstrated, and hence, in a sense, no conclusion can be 
established. 
While the crits could be correct in their view of the existence of inner conflict 
and its effect on law, that conclusion does not flow from the observation that it may 
be more difficult to recognize error in legal hunches than in mathematical intuitions. 
As seen, any errors in the hunches of Fermat or Goldbach are just as difficult to 
detect or demonstrate. 
Further, Hayek would respond to this difficulty in reconciling conflict in law, not 
by agreeing that there are no rules of law, but instead by arguing that we simply 
have difficulty expressing the law as it exists.7• In his view of law as a spontane-
ous social order, law has evolved with human societies and indeed has been a factor 
in which groups survive, but humans have never been able to provide complete 
statements of the law.8!l What would appear to be inconsistencies are simply 
inabilities to explain the rules that resolve conflicts between competing principles. 
For Hayek, these rules exist but have never been completely captured in legal 
opinion or statute. While not wanting to adopt this view, it does offer an 
explanation for conflict other than the nonexistence of legal rules. 
75. Fermat claimed, in a marginal note in one of his books, that he had a proof for his "theorem." 
Fermat's proof, if it was in fact a valid proof, ha.~ not survived. See id. Princeton University 
mathematician Andrew Wiles ha.~ recently offered a proof of Fermat's Theorem. While promising, the 
proof is still undergoing examination for validity. See John Schwartz, This Equatioll Figures to Answer 
a J7th·Cellfllry Puzzle, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 1993, at A3. 
76. See Bell, supra note 74, at 510. Despite the fact that these propositions are unproven, they may 
be used so long a.~ any results derived are recognized a.~ ba.~ed on the a.~sumption that the proposition 
is true. 
77. See Duncan Kennedy, Fmm and Substallce ill Private Law Adjudicatio/l, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976). See generally KELMAN, supra note 37, at 15-63. 
78. It is also true of a formal system, such as mathematics, that if a set of assumptions contains two 
contradictory propositions, then any conclusion may be derived from the set of assumptions. 
79. See FRIEDRtCH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 72-93 (1973) (chapter 4). 
80. See id. 
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One last comparison of the mathematician with the realist judge draws on the role 
of intuition in mathematical discovery. That role was mentioned by both the 
mathematicians81 ar,d the judges82 examined above. An interesting look at the 
mathematics role is provided by Professor Douglas Hofstadter's examination of idiot 
savants and Srinivasa Ramanujan, one of the century's greatest mathematicians.H) 
The idiot savant, more kindly the autistic savant, may perform very complex 
calculations - for example, multiplying two IOO-digit numbers mentally, without 
being able to explain the process employed. Hofstadter states that psychological 
research concludes (hat such individuals do not receive flashes of enlightenment or 
occult or divine inspiration, though it may seem that way to the individual savant. 
Rather, they race through the sequential steps of the calculation with more speed 
and self-conndence than the rest of us.84 
Ramanujan had similar ability, but at a much more advanced and abstract level. 
. He is said to have been able simply to state important and complex results. 
Sometimes he could give some insight into the processKS but sometimes claimed 
inspiration from the goddess Namagiri in his dreams.86 Ramanujan had a familiari-
ty with mathematical entities that allowed him seemingly to intuit difficult results, 
but perhaps the better characterization of his mental activities is that he was able to 
race through the sorts of generalizations and analogies employed by more ordinary 
mathematicians,. and by non-mathematicians, with such speed and at such a 
subconscious level, that he could not explain the reasoning process. 
Such an explanation would fit Professor Littlewood's explanation of illumination 
as "the emergence of the creative idea into the conscious ... imply[ing] some 
mysterious rapport between the subconscious and the conscious."H7 It also meshes 
with Professor Sylvester's description of mathematics "springing direct from the 
inherent powers and activity of the human mind, and from continually renewed 
introspection of that inner world of thought .... "88 
If the process by which the mathematician intuits the conclusion, before working 
backward to the pn::mises, is a subconscious process guided by experience with 
those premises, the same may well be true of even the realist judge. If a judge has 
a great deal of experience ruminating about the law, that ruminating would seem 
more likely to affect his or her legal conclusions than the rumination involving the 
judge's breakfast. If the hunch or intuition is guided by experience in the law, then 
the hunch or experience is, if not rule governed, at least rule affected. 
Consequently, the:: judge and the mathematician both seem to work backwards 
from the hunch, but both may in a sense be working back to their actual starting 
81. See supra notes 45. 50. 53 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
83. DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER. GODEL, EsCHER. BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 562-67 
(I 979}. 
84. [d. at 567. 
85. See id. at 565 (discussing a solution involving complex fractions). 
86. [d. at 566. 
87. Littlewood. supra note 48. at 3. 
88. See supra note 54. 
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points. When the subconscious route from those starting points to the hunch 
followed an acceptable path, from the standpoint of mathematical or legal reasoning, 
that reasoning may be reversed to find the starting points. The judge or mathemati-
cian must then reconstruct, as much as can be done, the earlier subconscious route 
to the conclusion. The fact that the reconstruction may be backward does not 
necessarily imply that the subconscious road to the original "hunch" was not 
forward from the premises or at least experience with the premises. 
The mathematician may find that he or she was mistaken. The subconscious route 
may have jumped a chasm to reach a conclusion to which no acceptable mathemati-
cal road may be constructed. Perhaps the difference between the good and the poor 
mathematician is the regularity with which their subconscious musings leap these 
breaks. The mathematician who spends a career trying to build unconstructable 
logical paths will not be recognized as a great mathematician. The mathematician 
who recognizes a few important, valid results and constructs the roads to those 
results will be so recognized. 
For the judge, the chasms are not as obvious. The judge is less likely to be 
confronted by the critic demonstrating the logical impossibility of a step in the 
judge's reconstruction of the subconscious route. Nonetheless, some opinions are 
clearly more strained than others. Perhaps the good judge, like the good mathemati-
cian, is the judge whose subconscious follows routes to conclusions that really do 
follow from the legal rules. When that judge reconstructs the route in an opinion, 
the opinion reads well. When the poorer judge follows a subconscious route to a 
poor conclusion, a route back might still be constructed. While that route will not 
reach an obvious chasm as is found in the erroneous mathematical hunch, it may 
lead to a strained opinion that, while not logically wrong, may be recognized as 
legally wrong. 
IV. Conclusion 
The point of this short article is not to completely refute the outgrowths of legal 
realism. The scholars of the critical legal studies movement offer interesting and 
important psychological arguments that indicate that conflict in the law mirrors 
psychological conflict within the individual. To whatever degree the individual 
conflict is irresolvable, so too would seem to be the conflict of legal principles. 
Similarly, those who argue from the indeterminacy of language also offer interesting 
arguments over the variety of meanings that might be assigned to any statement of 
a legal rule. 
What has been attacked is the import of the initial observations that started the 
realists and the later crits and indeterminists down the road to the claims that there 
are no legal rules. The realists' observation of appearing to work backwards from 
judgment to opinion is similar to the observations of mathematicians that they too 
work backwards. Since mathematics would seem to be the paradigm of a rule 
governed system, that simple observation of the perceived direction of effort cannot 
be taken as proof that there are no rules, either in mathematics or in law. 
HeinOnline -- 46 Okla. L. Rev. 234 1993
